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ABSTRACT
Bluetooth is one of the most established technologies for short
range digital wireless data transmission. With the advent of wear-
ables and the Internet of Things (IoT), Bluetooth has again gained
importance, which makes security research and protocol optimiza-
tions imperative. Surprisingly, there is a lack of openly available
tools and experimental platforms to scrutinize Bluetooth. In par-
ticular, system aspects and close to hardware protocol layers are
mostly uncovered.
We reverse engineer multiple Broadcom Bluetooth chipsets that
are widespread in off-the-shelf devices. Thus, we offer deep in-
sights into the internal architecture of a popular commercial family
of Bluetooth controllers used in smartphones, wearables, and IoT
platforms. Reverse engineered functions can then be altered with
our InternalBlue Python framework—outperforming evaluation kits,
which are limited to documented and vendor-defined functions.
The modified Bluetooth stack remains fully functional and high-
performance. Hence, it provides a portable low-cost research plat-
form.
InternalBlue is a versatile framework and we demonstrate its
abilities by implementing tests and demos for known Bluetooth
vulnerabilities. Moreover, we discover a novel critical security issue
affecting a large selection of Broadcom chipsets that allows exe-
cuting code within the attacked Bluetooth firmware. We further
show how to use our framework to fix bugs in chipsets out of ven-
dor support and how to add new security features to Bluetooth
firmware.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Mobile and wireless security; •Net-
works→ Link-layer protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth, the standard for wireless short range communication,
has been around for almost 25 years since Ericsson developed it in
1994. In the early days it was mainly applied to wireless headphones,
hands-free speakerphones, and replacement of infrared data links
between devices [16]. Today, Bluetooth experiences a comeback
with the use of wearables and the IoT, often using Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) introduced in version 4.0. Its latest specifications,
Bluetooth 5.0 and 5.1, provide new interesting features such as mesh
networking and localization [19, 20], and indicate that Bluetooth
will play an important role in the future of wireless communication.
Bluetooth security and performance have only been studied
selectively, which is a stark contrast to the extensive analysis of the
Wi-Fi standard over the same period of time. This can be partially
attributed to the availability of powerful, open-source tools which
allow easy experiments on raw Wi-Fi frames with low-cost, off-the-
shelf hardware. When the first patches forWi-Fi drivers enabled the
so-calledmonitor mode and frame injection capabilities, researchers
soon implemented practical attacks on low-level parts of the Wi-
Fi stack and the currently deprecated Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) standard [14, 28] in short order. Only recently [8, 9, 12],
the firmware running on Wi-Fi cards has been shown to contain
severe over-the-air vulnerabilities. Publicly available tools allow to
alter off-the-shelf Broadcom Wi-Fi cards [34], along with easy to
understand open source Wi-Fi SDR implementations [5, 15].
Blueborne is a state-of-the-art collection of weaknesses uncov-
ered inmost of themajor Bluetooth stacks, and has raised awareness
of different issues concerning Bluetooth security. However, Blue-
borne targets host-side Bluetooth drivers in opposition to the lower
layers of the protocol, below the Host Controller Interface (HCI),
which are handled in firmware and are still difficult to audit. A
recent Bluetooth attack concerns Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange used during device pairing, where the at-
tacker replaces public key coordinates during transmission, which
were not checked in most implementations [13].
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Unfortunately, compared to Wi-Fi there is no similarly easy way
to monitor and manipulate the behavior of lower Bluetooth layers
depicted in Figure 1. On the one hand, professional equipment
targeted at hardware developers exists, but is very expensive. On
the other hand, modifiable open-source platforms still struggle with
fundamental problems such as frequency-hopping characteristics
of the Bluetooth Physical Layer (PHY).
This paper is the groundwork for a platform focused on Blue-
tooth low layer protocol modifications and security. It targets the
firmware of the BroadcomBluetooth chipset named BCM4339, which
resides inside the Nexus 5. We tested and extended parts of the func-
tionality to Nexus 6P, Samsung Galaxy S6/S6 edge, Raspberry Pi 3/3+
and a Bluetooth 5.0 IoT evaluation kit.
On top of reverse engineering results, the outcome of this work
is the research and analysis framework InternalBlue which enables
direct interaction with Broadcom firmware internals at runtime.
The framework consists of a flexible Python library which acts as
an interface to the firmware over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB).
It is supplemented with an interactive front-end which supports
live analysis of the firmware and low-level Bluetooth activities. The
most important capabilities of InternalBlue are:
• modifying arbitrary memory regions including Read Only
Memory (ROM),
• run arbitrary code in the context of the running firmware,
• send arbitrary HCI commands to the chip,
• establish connections to non-visible devices, and
• enable monitor mode and injection for the Link Manager
Protocol (LMP).
Access to LMP stands out for transforming an off-the-shelf low-
cost smartphone into an LMP monitor and injection device, while
enabling security testing. To the best of our knowledge, there exists
no openly available solution to monitor and craft LMP messages
in the context of Bluetooth connections. Such a tool is especially
useful for researching and testing other Bluetooth devices on the
Link Manager (LM) layer, which controls important features such
as security parameters and frequency settings.
To demonstrate the capabilities of InternalBlue, we use it to test
for known Bluetooth bugs. On top of this, we detect a new severe
vulnerability inside the firmware, which affected a huge fraction of
Broadcom Bluetooth chips in use in December 2018. We perform
the following security demos and contributions with InternalBlue:
• test for user interaction behavior of pairing devices without
input and output capabilities [29],
• test for a known ECDH pairing vulnerability [13],
• Media Access Control (MAC) address filter within LMP to
improve security,
• emulation framework to fuzz malicious payloads and trace
their call graph, and
• discovery of a severe security vulnerability (CVE-2018-19860)
that allows to crash various Broadcom Bluetooth firmwares
and execute a subset of functions within them.
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Figure 1: Architecture of the Bluetooth Protocol Stack.
InternalBlue is publicly available including various demos1. We
disclosed all issues reported before handing in this paper to Broad-
com, who has acknowledged them and has already provided fixes
to vendors.
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 describes relevant
Broadcom specifications and how to reverse engineer the firmware.
Based on this knowledge, the implementation of InternalBlue is
explained in Section 3, including the application of an LMP toolkit.
InternalBlue is then used to check for multiple known issues in
the Bluetooth standard in Section 4. Further investigation in Sec-
tion 5 leads to Broadcom specific issues that allow code execution
within Bluetooth firmware. Section 4 and Section 5 contain the main
contributions of this paper—readers who are not interested in the
efforts required to open a closed source firmware and do not want
to reproduce results can skip Section 2 and Section 3. Related work
is listed in Section 6. Results are discussed in Section 7. Section 8
concludes this paper.
2 FIRMWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING
This section summarizes the information on the internal structure
and functioning of the Broadcom BCM4339 Bluetooth controller.
The information has been gathered through reverse engineering the
controller’s firmware according to the Bluetooth specifications [18],
and also from the datasheet in [25]. Some functions can be clearly
mapped to standardized Bluetooth procedures, because they use
uniquely specified values. However, going from machine code to
assembly and data sections and then naming functions is a tedious
process and nobody publicly did this for Broadcom Bluetooth chips
before. The normal procedure for experimenting with lower layer
Bluetooth would be signing a non-disclosure agreement with a ven-
dor. However, in that case, results would not be openly publishable
to the community. Reverse engineering techniques presented in
this section apply to all Broadcom Bluetooth chips and might also
be helpful in similar projects.
Readers who do not want to add their own functions to Inter-
nalBlue but at least use already existing functions themselves can
directly proceed to Section 3. Readers who are only interested in
applications and outcomes can proceed to Section 4.
1https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue
2.1 Hardware Architecture
The BCM4339 combines a Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11ac and Bluetooth 4.1
transceiver on a single chip. A simplified architecture overview
is depicted in Figure 2. Inside the chip, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth units
operate on separated processor cores. The Bluetooth processor is an
ARM Cortex-M3, which has 196 kB Random Access Memory (RAM)
and 608 kB ROM. Both, RAM and ROM, are split up into two sec-
tions respectively as seen in Table 1. In addition, the chip contains
a Bluetooth modem controlled by the Bluetooth Baseband Core. This
component handles the lower layers of the Bluetooth protocol stack,
while the higher layers such as the link and device manager are
implemented in the Cortex-M3. Components are interconnected by
an ARM Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB).
Communication with the host system is done via HCI over a
Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) interface or
Universal Serial Bus (USB). Host communication includes a Pulse-
code Modulation (PCM) connector for transferring audio data.
2.2 Reading, Writing, and Executing RAM
HCI provides a uniform method for the host to access controller
capabilities and send or receive data from underlying Bluetooth
links. The protocol is based on commands the host sends to the con-
troller, and events the controller sends to the host. Accessing HCI
on the host requires superuser rights, the concrete implementation
depends on the operating system. HCI is never directly sent over
the air.
Apart from the standardized HCI commands [18], the BCM4339
implements many vendor specific commands partially listed in the
Table 1: Memory Map of the Firmware’s Address Space.
Start End Size Type Description
0x000000 0x090000 576 kB ROM Firmware
0x0D0000 0x0D8000 32 kB RAM Patchram
0x200000 0x228000 160 kB RAM Stack & Heap
0x260000 0x268000 32 kB ROM Data & Jumptables
0x310000 0x310400 1 kB IO Patchram Control
Driver
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Figure 2: Simplified Combo Chip Architecture [25].
datasheet [26]. The Write_RAM, Read_RAM, Download_Minidriver
and Launch_RAM commands are relevant in order to understand
firmware patching and debugging, as described in Section 3.1.
Read_RAM reads memory chunks from the chip’s RAM and ROM
address space and sends them back to the host in the HCI command
complete event. Reading unmapped addresses causes the chip to
crash.
Write_RAM can be used to write memory chunks to RAM regions
of the chip’s memory. If attempting to write to a ROM section, the
command has no effect.
Download_Minidriver will put the device into a special mode
in which it is safe to receive patches, normal Bluetooth activity
is disabled. Only a very reduced subset of HCI commands is in-
terpreted in download mode, including Read_RAM, Write_RAM and
Launch_RAM. Launch_RAM is being used to exit download mode and
reboot into the normal Bluetooth firmware. Any downloaded ROM
patches are applied at an early stage during this reboot.
Launch_RAM continues code execution on the chip at a speci-
fied address using Thumb mode. One of the intended use cases
is to exit Download_Minidriver mode by passing the pseudo-
address 0xFFFFFFFF to Launch_RAM. This applies the downloaded
patches, quits download Download_Minidriver, and goes back
into Bluetooth mode. Another use case is to jump to the entry
point of a so-called Minidriver which was previously loaded into
RAM using the Download_Minidriver and Write_RAM commands.
Support of Write_RAM, Read_RAM, and Launch_RAM is essential for
InternalBlue. These HCI commands can be considered security crit-
ical, as the installed patches are not checked for a signature or
similar from the vendor; hence, allowing malicious code installa-
tion. They exist throughout all chip versions—including one of the
most recent chips CYW20735. Technically, this means InternalBlue
can be ported to all current Broadcom and Cypress Bluetooth chips.
2.3 Updating Firmware and ROM
The Android Bluetooth driver includes an HCD file with firmware
updates and patches in its initialization procedure. By first reading
the name of the chip via an HCI command it is able to search
for a matching HCD file inside the /system/vendor/firmware
directory. It applies the HCD file and then continues with normal
chip initialization.
An HCD file contains multiple Write_RAM commands adding
new functions and data to the RAM sections of the chip. The HCD
file terminates with a Launch_RAM command with 0xFFFFFFFF as
argument in order to reboot into Bluetooth mode and apply the
patches.
Patches to ROM cannot be applied with Write_RAM, but with a
special Patchram mechanism. Although this mechanism is men-
tioned in the BCM4339 datasheet [25], it is not publicly documented
and therefore had to be reverse engineered. All ROMpatches are col-
lected in a list and written to a custom RAM address. The list is for-
matted as a chain of Type-Length-Value (TLV) objects. Each entry
starts with a one-byte type field followed by a two-byte length of the
payload. Finally, Launch_RAM will exit the Download_Minidriver
state, apply patches to ROM and enter normal Bluetooth mode.
The TLV type 0x08 is used for single 32 bit patches to the ROM
(called Patchram). The length of the value is fixed to 15 bytes with
the following semantic:
1 Byte 4 Bytes 4 Bytes 2 Bytes 4 Bytes
#slot address value 0x0000 unknown
The final effect of this Patchram object is: the new value virtually
overwrites four bytes of memory inside the ROM, which are located
at the target address. Patchram patches only last until the next
reset. Internally this is done by writing the value into a table at
address 0xD0000 (RAM) and the target address into another table
at address 0x310000 (hardware register). For both tables the index
is given by the slot number and the tables are capable of holding
up to 128 entries which correspond to slot numbers 0 to 127.
Overwriting 128 values of 4 bytes in ROM is not much, but
this is sufficient to inject branch commands into the beginnings of
functions and then redefining them inside the RAM. The Nexus 5
HCDfile inAndroid 6 already uses 113 Patchram slots—therefore not
only limiting the amount of modifications InternalBlue can install
but also future vendor bugfixes. Broadcom has realized that this issue
reduces patching abilities, and thus provides more Patchram slots
on newer chips, for instance, the Nexus 6P has now 192 slots. Yet,
newer chips are also shipped with more code, raising the probability
of erroneous code that requires fixes.
To overcome this shortage of Patchram slots, meta patches being
responsible for multiple patches could be inserted in popular parts
of the program flow. However, such meta patches require more
code and free RAM is also a very limited resource.
2.4 Link Manager Functions
The LM communicates with the LMs of other controllers via the
LMP in order to establish and control links between devices. Its
tasks include to set-up and control logical transports and links,
synchronize clocks between Bluetooth master and slaves, control
frequency hopping sequence, and set-up authentication and encryp-
tion. Relevant information exchanged on the LM is then passed by
the firmware via HCI to the host.
At the core of the LM in the BCM4339 firmware is a handler table
for each LMP opcode. The table starts at the address 0x261610 in
the second half of the ROM. Each table entry has a length of 8 bytes
and contains the following values:
4 Bytes 1 Byte 3 Bytes
*function lmp_packet_len additional info
A thread periodically checks for incoming LMP packets and calls
the function LMP_dispatcher if new packets arrive. A global data
structure lm_curCmd at address 0x200478 holds information about
the received packet currently being processed. The LMP dispatcher
reads the opcode from lm_curCmd, retrieves the corresponding
entry from the LMP function table and finally calls the handler
function from the retrieved entry.
Handler functions take a pointer to a structure representing the
respective connection as their only argument. They get the payload
for the received packet from lm_curCmd. If the received packet
requires a response, the handler crafts a new LMP packet and calls
send_LMP_packet. This function puts the packet into a transmit
buffer for the respective connection.
2.5 Reversing Evaluation Kits
Evaluation boards such as CYW920735Q60EVB-01 for the CYW20735
Bluetooth 5.0 chipset are supported by WICED Studio [24]. They
do not only run a basic Bluetooth firmware—which has only minor
changes compared to other versions—but also an application like
a temperature sensor providing readings. Simple applications not
requiring their own processor make this type of chips suitable
for IoT implementations.WICED applications are tightly coupled
to firmware, for example they use the same thread initialization
function. Investigating similarities we found a binary file patch
.elf which defines almost all symbols, a total of 11813 function
and 2818 object names. Note that access to firmware definitions
usually requires a non-disclosure agreement with the vendor, and
the binary format of patch.elf abstracts them in a way that is hard
to search for. When finding this source of information, we already
had invested months of reverse engineering Nexus 5 firmware—all
LM functions were located by searching for opcodes defined in the
standard.
Locating functions in CYW20735 also helps to reverse engineer
other Broadcom chips. Binary diffing tools can apply heuristics to
locate similar functions. Yet, when using IDA Pro BinDiff [1] only
6% of the named objects and functions are found in the Nexus 5
firmware, more than half of them being false positives, despite only
selecting matches with at least 90% similarity. The good news is
that a non-automated search shows way more correct similarities
including complete libraries that did not change over 6 years of
development. Low variation in the code and missing obfuscation
due to performance and space requirements makes porting Inter-
nalBlue firmware patches comparably easy. However, there are also
new features introduced over those 6 years, updated libraries and
architectural changes, as well as variances in compilation that make
BinDiff giving bad results. Thus, previous reversing of the Nexus 5
smartphone still provides interesting insights.
Despite knowing many original function names from WICED
Studio, we continue using our own comprehensible names through-
out this paper. For the curious reverser, the most relevant functions
LMP_dispatcher and send_LMP_packet are originally called lm_
HandleLmpReceivedPdu and DHM_LMPTx.
3 BASIC INTERNALBLUE FUNCTIONS
Knowledge gathered in the previous section is used to create In-
ternalBlue, an open and extendable Bluetooth research framework
based on BCM4339 and other Broadcom chips. The aim is to repur-
pose off-the-shelf consumer devices as analysis tools for experi-
menting with the lower layers of Bluetooth connections. This is
Table 2: Currently Supported Chips by InternalBlue,
* refers to the diagnostic protocol [21].
Chip Patchram LMP Tracepoint Device
BCM4339 ✓ ✓ ✓ Nexus 5 / Xperia Z3
BCM4358 ✓ ✓ × Nexus 6P /
Samsung Galaxy S6 [edge]
BCM4343 ✓ * × Raspberry Pi 3
BCM4345 ✓ * × Raspberry Pi 3+
CYW20735 ✓ * ✓ Evaluation Kit
done by patching the controller’s firmware and writing additional
software for the host side which communicates with the firmware
over HCI.
The first basic firmware tweaks focus on integrating LMP func-
tionality into InternalBlue. As shown in Figure 1, LMP resides below
HCI, with the latter already being accessible on Android. Monitor-
ing and modification of layers below allows for more fine-grained
observations and changes, and details on LMP inside the firmware
give insights where to integrate own functions. Therefore, we imple-
ment an LMP monitor and then extend it with injection capabilities.
An overview of currently supported chips and tested features is
given in Table 2. Reading and writing RAM worked on any Broad-
com chip we encountered so far; thus, we only list the special
Patchram, LMP and tracepoint debugging features. Patches for
those features depend solely on the chip, but we list the device used
for testing. An alternate way to implement LMP without patches
is a proprietary diagnostic protocol [21]. Check out the current
repositories to get an up to date list.
3.1 Architecture
The architecture of the framework allows for close inspection and
manipulation of the Bluetooth controller while being actively used
by Android. Figure 4 shows an overview of the system which con-
sists of an Android device with an embedded Broadcom Bluetooth
controller, and a Linux host running the InternalBlue framework,
which is written in Python. The Android device is connected to the
host via ADB.
The framework relies on debug functionality in the Android
Bluetooth stack such as the HCI Snoop Log feature. This feature
writes a capture file of all HCI packets which were transferred
between the Android host and the Bluetooth controller. Despite
LMP resides below HCI, adjusted LMP traffic can be forwarded over
this interface to the host. Once HCI Snoop Log has been enabled
through the Android developer settings, a capture file is written
to the internal memory of the Android device. It uses the Snoop
Packet Capture format which is specified in RFC 1761 [11]. Each
HCI packet is encapsulated in a Snoop Record which also stores
length and time information in a Record Header.
If the Android Bluetooth stack is compiled with debugging
features enabled (BT_NET_DEBUG), networking features in aosp
/platform/system/bt/+/master/hci/src/btsnoop_net.c are
activated and Android opens two TCP ports listening on local-
host [7]:
127.0.0.1:8872 outputs every HCI packet exchanged between
the Android Bluetooth stack and the Bluetooth controller
using the Snoop file format.
127.0.0.1:8873 accepts HCI commands in the format of Snoop
Records, which the Android Bluetooth stack will send the
Bluetooth controller.
Compilation with BT_NET_DEBUG enabled was tested and confirmed
to be working on Android Open Source Project (AOSP) Android
6.0.1 and 7.1.2, and LineageOS 14.1.
If the host system in which the Bluetooth controller resides is not
Android but Linux with BlueZ, sending HCI commands works out
of the box without further changes using AF_BLUETOOTH sockets.
3.2 Command Line Interface
The InternalBlue Command Line Interface (CLI) offers a multicol-
ored User Interface (UI) shown in Figure 3. It implements various
commands to conveniently access the firmware on any Broadcom
or Cypress Bluetooth chip:
• read and presentmemory in various different representations
including disassembly,
• write data to memory in different representations,
• search for data in the memory of the firmware,
• execute custom code snippets in the firmware,
• activate monitor mode for HCI and forward the received
packets to Wireshark [4],
• inject arbitrary HCI packets, and
• establish connections by MAC address.
Moreover, the following extensions are available as assembly
patches for BCM4339 on the Nexus 5:
• activate monitor mode for LMP over HCI,
• inject arbitrary—also invalid—LMP packets, and
• set tracepoints.
Figure 3: InternalBlue CLI.
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Figure 4: System Overview of InternalBlue.
Executed commands are saved in a history file and it is possible
to browse to an earlier command by pressing the arrow-up key as
it is known from similar CLIs.
HCI and LMP monitoring modes directly openWireshark with
correct connection parameters, while the latter also applies the
required patches to the firmware. To use InternalBlue simply as an
HCI live monitor and injector on any Android device—no matter if
the device has a Broadcom chipset or not—it is sufficient to recompile
the Android Bluetooth stack with debug features. To the best of
our knowledge, InternalBlue is the only project providing Python
bindings to access HCI on remote Android devices.
3.3 LMP Monitor and Injection Mode
The LM is responsible for pairing, managing connections, as well
as many other interesting processes which can now be monitored
and modified with the feature developed in this section. In contrast
to HCI, its contents are sent over the air between devices. As LMP
operates exclusively beneath the HCI protocol layer, it is usually
impossible to monitor or directly manipulate it from the host. By
using the knowledge gained in Section 2.4 and the patching ca-
pabilities of InternalBlue, BCM4339 firmware can be modified to
relay LMP packets to the host and provide an interface for injecting
arbitrary LMP packets into an established connection.
The receive path of the monitor mode patch is illustrated in
Figure 6. It starts at the LMP_dispatcher function that processes
incoming packets by invoking the responsible handler function
for the specific LMP opcode. By hooking the dispatcher function,
the received packet can be copied and transferred to the host via
a custom HCI event packet. In addition, the function send_LMP_
packet responsible for sending LMP packets to a remote device is
also hooked in order to have access to those packets on the host. At
the host side, the monitor feature installs an HCI receiver callback,
which listens for the custom HCI events, processes them and passes
the LMP packets to a Wireshark instance. As Wireshark is not able
to dissect LMP packets by default, it is necessary to install a custom
dissector plugin for this protocol. Fortunately, the Ubertooth project
[30] includes such a plugin that, after minor modifications and
functional bugfixes, can be used for this purpose. The InternalBlue
command monitor lmp start automatically installs hooks for
monitoring LMP traffic inside the firmware and starts a Wireshark
instance as seen in Figure 5.
Injection of arbitrary LMP packets into an established Bluetooth
connection works by invoking the send_LMP_packet function in-
side the firmware, which in turn will enqueue the packet into the
queue for outgoing LMP packets. To this end, the payload and a
small assembly code stub are written to the RAM and invoked with
the Launch_RAM HCI command. The stub copies the payload into
a freshly allocated buffer and calls the send_LMP_packet function
with a pointer to the corresponding connection structure. It also
makes sure that the Transaction ID (TID) bit in the LMP header is
set correctly based on whether the device is master or slave in the
connection. If the fuzzing feature is enabled over the command line,
an additional patch skips opcode and packet length checks.
Figure 5: LMP Monitor.
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Figure 6: Receive Path of the LMP Monitor Mode.
4 TESTING FOR KNOWN SECURITY ISSUES
Inside the InternalBlue CLI we implement the feature to connect
to any device by its MAC address even without prior pairing, as
described in Section 4.1. As a demonstration of security research,
we implement device testing for the so-called NiÃśo attack—pairing
devices without input and output—in Section 4.2 as well as an attack
on ECDH device pairing key exchange in Section 4.3.
Implementations of the ECDH and NiÃśo tests are not contained
as InternalBlue commands but as example files2 that use func-
tions of InternalBlue as library. Since the connecting smartphone
itself performs the attacks and there is no such thing as Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM), then these implementations are only suitable
for testing how other Bluetooth stacks react to ECDH and NiÃśo
attacks—we do not provide active attacks on a victim’s established
connections.
4.1 Establishing Connections to “Invisible”
Devices
Bluetooth devices can be invisible to scanning but still accept con-
nections. This is the default behavior for a setup with a smartphone
and a headset, with the headset connecting to the smartphone when
turned on knowing its MAC address from previous communication.
2https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue/tree/master/examples
Surprisingly to most users, initiating a connection request to a de-
vice does not require previous pairing. Everything that needs to be
known is a valid MAC address [31]. InternalBlue can list the array
of all current connections and initiate new connections with the
command syntax connect de:ad:be:ef:00:00.
Existence of a connection inside the firmware’s list is required to
send LMP packets. This list differs from the list of known devices
on the host, it is just meant to manage connection statuses of ongo-
ing connections. A connection is not required to be established to
appear in this list, it is sufficient to initiate a connection. If a connec-
tion establishment is not successful, it will stay half a minute inside
the firmware’s list until it is deleted. This allows to send arbitrary
LMP commands to arbitrary devices without successful pairing.
4.2 No Input No Output
Bluetooth provides pairing based on ECDH key exchange with
Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) to be secure against passive and active
MITM attacks. Security against active MITM is provided by visual
number comparison or entering a number shown on one device
with a keyboard on the other device. This protection requires both
devices to have Input and Output (IO) capabilities, which is often
not the case for IoT gadgets and headsets. The fallback option in case
of missing IO capabilities is to perform key exchange without active
MITM protection, the so-called “Just Works” mode. The Bluetooth
5.0 standard explicitly marks this as being insecure, but does not
suggest to show any warnings to the user.
Exchange of IO capabilities supported by the devices takes
place before pairing. Since there is no established root of trust
between them at this stage, IO capabilities are prone to active
attacks themselves—an active MITM can replace capabilities by no
input no output, also known as the NiÃśo attack [29].
We patch the SSP state machine and claim our Nexus 5 has no
display and no keyboard. Our question is if vendors accept a “Just
Works” pairing with asking a “yes/no” message or warn the user to
check if the device they are pairing to really has no IO capabilities.
Even though certificate warnings in browser have been there for
years to warn users, warning from potentially insecure Bluetooth
pairings seems to be uncommon. Neither Android nor iOS warn
users about this.
Figure 7 shows a modified Nexus 5 pairing with an iPhone 6.
The only modification in the SSP state machine function located
at 0x303D4 is to always set the IO capabilities to 0x03 in variable
0x20387D, with 0x03 resembling no input and no output according
to the Bluetooth 5.0 specification [18]. Algorithms within Nexus 5
are not coded to consider the case of no longer having a display
with such a change, and continue passing a code to Android, which
actually works because keys are derived similarly either way. iPhone
6 simply displays a “yes/no” message and pairing is achieved. Yet,
operating systems seem to cache some of these information locally,
making tampering with IO capabilities hard if not applied within
each pairing. To ensure a NiÃśo attack works, an attacker should
be present during the first pairing. Users will not be displayed any
warnings if a NiÃśo attack fails due to detection of inconsistent IO
capabilities, but pairing will be aborted.
Nexus 5 with IO capabilities iPhone 6
Pairing request without
IO capabilities
Figure 7: “Just Works” Pairing on iOS 12.1.4.
4.3 ECDH Device Pairing Vulnerability Scan
Another application of InternalBlue is a security test for the fixed
coordinate invalid curve attack (CVE-2018-5383) [13]. This attack
affects device pairing based on ECDH, both SSP used in classic
Bluetooth and LE Secure Connections (LE SC) used in BLE. The un-
derlying protocol vulnerability exists if a Bluetooth implementation
does not check for invalid curve parameters in the key. Since the
Bluetooth standard does not consider countermeasures against this
type of attack mandatory, vulnerable implementations are wide-
spread. Testing for this attack is not straightforward, though, as
the authors did not release any tools and the attack requires special
hardware.
We implement the semi-passive fixed coordinate invalid curve
attack, which zeroes the y-coordinates of both public keys, belong-
ing to the InternalBlue smartphone and the device under test. If
the device under test does not perform an invalid curve parameter
check, this semi-passive attack would be successful in 25% of all de-
vice pairing attempts under the original attack’s assumptions [13].
In contrast, the InternalBlue success rate is raised to 50% by setting
an even smartphone private key, which is possible since the attack
model is not a wireless link under control but the actual smart-
phone initiating a connection. Although not performing this attack
as MITM, testing other smartphones is fast and portable with our
solution.
InternalBlue could also help to fix this vulnerability in older
Broadcom Bluetooth chips. Applying security patches this way is
feasible if a vendor is no longer supporting old chips or reacts
slowly in publishing updates.
5 DISCOVERING AND FIGHTING NEW
VULNERABILITIES
While exploring command handlers we have found a severe vulner-
ability affecting a variety of devices, as described in Section 5.1. To
analyze the vulnerability’s impact, we implement runtime testing
and emulation solutions, as detailed in Section 5.2, which can also
be used to detect further bugs or simply to locate and dissect more
functions and realize more features. In Section 5.3 we come up with
a solution that can help against even more attacks.
5.1 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
In the following we explain how we discovered CVE-2018-19860,
a vulnerability allowing to execute a subset of functions within a
large set of Broadcom firmwares. The vulnerability only requires
the device under attack to have Bluetooth enabled, no previous
pairing or visibility to the attacker are required.
5.1.1 Vulnerability. While dissecting the LMP dispatcher and an-
alyzing its functions, we found vendor specific commands. The
Bluetooth standard only defines vendor specific commands on HCI
layer which can be locally executed on the host as superuser, but
Broadcom uses LMP opcode 0x00 for Broadcom Proprietary Control
Signaling (BPCS) mapped by lm_BPCS_getLmpInfoType. Explor-
ing this unusual LMP handler we discovered that it accepts 256
input values in the field following opcode 0x00. Broadcom only
intended to implement BPCS commands 0x0000–0x0005. Each of
these commands is defined in the same handler table syntax as the
standard LMP handler described in Section 2.4, but because of a
missing range check commands 0x0006–0x00ff interpret memory
located after the intended BPCS handler table similarly.
Compilers tend to put similar library functions close to each
other. Even though compiling is hard to predict and contents are
different for each Broadcom chip, it is very likely that handler tables
are put after each other. On Nexus 5 other handler tables are indeed
put after the BPCS handler table and include an interesting selection
of HCI commands shown in Figure 8 that never should be launched
from a remote host, such as Launch_RAM. Function arguments are
passed in different only partially controllable registers when called
over this path, for example, Launch_RAM is executed but always
launches an invalid address. Execution of invalid commands or
accessing invalid memory just crashes the Bluetooth firmware and
has no further side effects. On some operating systems, the driver
restarts Bluetooth automatically within a minute, but even in this
case ongoing connections are interrupted. In general, chances to
simply crash the Broadcom firmware are high.
Interpreting out of bounds commands in Figure 8 also results in
extremely long LMP packets, i.e. the handler for command 0x0095
has a length of 219 bytes.When trying to use InternalBlue’s sendlmp
00 95, the packet seems to be sent according to the monitoring
hooks but is never actually sent because the LMP packet buffer
is limited to 32 bytes. When attacking other smartphones with
a Nexus 5, the attacker first needs to patch the vulnerable BPCS
handler locally and can then change length and option fields. A
Nexus 5 under attack will not wait to receive all 219 bytes and just
interprets the LMP packet with the wrong length.
BCM4339 on Nexus 5 is a combo chip using a shared antenna
for Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. Further investigating crashes on Nexus 5
shows that crashes result in 2–5 s interrupts on 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi only.
5 GHz Wi-Fi is not affected. Similar Wi-Fi interrupts also happen
during normal Bluetooth pairing. However, they do not seem to
happen when regularly exchanging data. Default configuration of
many systems is to restart Bluetooth after a crash, an attacker can
reduce Wi-Fi performance multiple times by attacking again when
the Bluetooth of the victim reappears. Analyzing possible causes for
this behavior is complicated—it could range from incorrect sharing
of the antenna up to Android specific issues.
5.1.2 Affected Devices. Vulnerable devices are easy to detect as
they do not answer BPCS commands with LMP_not_accepted.
Very old Broadcom chips do not implement these commands at
all and are not vulnerable. Broadcom did not share a list of vulnera-
ble devices after we reported the issues, but we found an interesting
selection listed in Table 3 by testing devices we had access to. A
major version number of 5 or lower seems to be secure against our
attack, but corresponds to the outdated Bluetooth 3.0 standard [17].
Only some of the chips with major version 8 were vulnerable, which
corresponds to Bluetooth 4.2.
Prior to pairing, devices need to exchange their version num-
ber within a LMP_version_req and LMP_version_resp to know
which version of the Bluetooth standard is supported by each other.
This request also includes a subversion that further specifies the
firmware version running on the chip. This gives the attacker hints
which payload could execute meaningful functions.
LMP input: 00 95 ...
LMP BPCS handler table
00 00 Features request
01 01 Features response
02 02 ...
05 05 BFC accept
Next (unknown) handler table
06 00 ...
07 01 ...
HCI link control handler table
HCI link policy handler table
HCI host controller handler table
HCI info parameter handler table
HCI status parameter handler table
HCI test handler table
95 03 Enable device under test mode
HCI vendor specific handler table
BD 4E Launch RAM (wrong parameters)
Figure 8: Jumping from one handler to another, exemplary
handlers picked from BCM4339 firmware.
Table 3: Known Vulnerable Devices.
Device Name Chip Version SubVersion
MacBook Pro 13” mid 2012 BCM4331 6 8859
iPhone 5 BCM4334 7 16653
iPhone 5s BCM4334 7 8707
Xperia Z5 BCM43xx 7 8975
Nexus 5, Xperia Z3,
Samsung Galaxy Note 3
BCM4339 7 24841
Raspberry Pi 3 BCM43430A1 7 8713
Huawei Honor 8 BCM4345 8 24857
iPhone 6 BCM4345 8 16649
MacBook Pro 13” early 2015 BCM2070x 8 8609
MacBook Pro 13” early 2015 #2 BCM20703A1 8 8614
MacBook Pro 2016 A1707 BCM20703A2 8 8752
MacBook Pro 2016 BCM20703A2 8 8774
We extracted firmware from various vulnerable and non-
vulnerable devices to further trace down when the function
lm_BPCS_getLmpInfoType was fixed and if handlers located be-
hind are indeed HCI or similar interesting functions. Firmware
internals of those versions that give most insights about patching
are listed below.
Raspberry Pi 3 / BCM43430A1 is vulnerable and its build
date is June 2 2014. It has a few callback function tables
located in the vulnerable memory region, but most of the
memory is filled with encryption constants.
Raspberry Pi 3+ / BCM4345C0 is not vulnerable and its
build date is August 19 2014.
MacBook Pro 2016 / BCM20703A2 is vulnerable and its
build date is October 22 2015. Various callback and HCI
function tables are located in the vulnerable memory region.
We assume that Broadcom internally discovered this bug in
summer 2014, but was not aware of its criticality at all when adding
the missing BPCS opcode check. Moreover, a newer build date
does not necessarily mean that a firmware has the newest library
versions, as the BCM20703A2 example shows.
As firmware development cycles are quite long—even the eval-
uation board is shipped with a one year old firmware—devices
released in 2016 are still vulnerable. We estimate around half of the
devices with Broadcom Bluetooth chips actively used in December
2018 to be vulnerable.
5.2 Firmware Emulation and Fuzzing
Exploring abilities gained with the BPCS vulnerability is hard. In
order to analyze crash causes and impact of non-crashing functions
we develop a toolchain that does not only allow hunting exploits but
actually exploring flow of information throughout the firmware.
5.2.1 Tracepoints. Functions are reached over long call graphs
with parameters depending on many dynamic inputs. The In-
ternalBlue command tp add 0x3f3f4 adds a tracepoint to LMP_
dispatcher. Each tracepoint is realized as Patchram hook. Once
a tracepoint is called, it is deleted from Patchram to prevent the
firmware from being stuck in tracepoints while debugging. A
tracepoint imitates the behavior of the original Broadcom fault
handler contained in the firmware and dumps all register contents
as well as stack and heap but continues operation afterward.
Multiple tracepoints can be observed in a row, i.e. to check behavior
of multiple functions called for a given input.
An example output for LMP_dispatcher is shown in List-
ing 1. The link register points to a function Broadcom named
lm_handleLmpMsg, r0 points to lm_curCmd.
5.2.2 Emulation with Unicorn and Radare2. To investigate the LMP
handler remote code execution, we use registers from a tracepoint
of LMP_dispatcher but install a second tracepoint in the handler
for BPCS itself to dump the according stack and heap contents of a
BPCS payload. With a combination of Unicorn and Radare2 wemod-
ify a Python script that emulates LMP_dispatcher [2, 3, 32]. BPCS
commands are passed by changing the according blocks in the stack
and heap memory region. Emulation of an LMP command stops if
the end of LMP_dispatcher is reached or a timeout is exceeded.
A call trace for LMP_dispatcher is given in Listing 2. In this case,
the function is passed the LMP packet 0x000a. Following handler
tables as in Figure 8, position 0x0a in the misinterpreted BPCS
handler table simply calls a NULL pointer that is then interpreted
as a function address, and ROM contents at 0x00000 are executed.
This trace is still very short because it crashes immediately, however
traces can become very complex and hard to analyze.
5.2.3 Call Trace and Memory Interpretation. The emulator recog-
nizes branches and extracts addresses when entering a new block
after a branch to generate a detailed call trace. Moreover it dumps
memory after finishing execution, which can later be compared
to the original state. BPCS commands that depend on arguments
passed to the handler can be located by emulating the same com-
mands multiple times with different inputs and then searching for
traces with different execution paths or by memory differences.
5.2.4 Crafting Exploits: Turn Remote Devices Into Jammers. One
function standing out in memory analysis changes the content of
a very high memory section, which turns out to be responsible
for test mode configuration. Further investigation reveals that the
LMP payload 0x0095 calls the HCI handler function enabling de-
vice under test mode. Without being embedded into HCI logic the
function gets executed but never appears in HCI Snoop Log on the
host. Therefore, a host under attack will not be able to filter or
observe this event.
[*] Tracepoint 0x3f3f4 was hit and deactivated:
pc: 0x0003f3f4 lr: 0x00008c33
sp: 0x0021734c cpsr: 0x00000000
r0: 0x00200478 r1: 0x002179a8
...
r11: 0x00000000 r12: 0x40000000
Listing 1: Tracepoint in LMP_Dispatcher.
0x3f3f4, 0x3f400, 0x42c04, 0x42c0a, 0x3f406,
0x3f40e, 0x3f418, 0x4a868, 0x4a87a, 0x3f41e,
0x3f426, 0x3f44c, 0x3f44e, 0x3f34c, 0xd30d0,
0xd3152, 0xd315e, 0xd3188, 0xd3192, 0xd3130,
0x3f456, 0x3f458, 0x3f464, 0x00000,
invalid memory 0x661e1000, invalid memory 0x65f7f3c0
Listing 2: Call Trace Starting at LMP_Dispatcher.
# LMP_set_AFH to disable hopping
sendlmp 60 0000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000
# Enable test mode via exploit
sendlmp 00 95
# LMP_test_activate
sendlmp 56 00
# LMP_test_control, TX frequency 2433 MHz
sendlmp 57 545575755555555255
Listing 3: Remote Jammer Attack.
After enabling test mode with the malicious payload, LMP_test
_activate and LMP_test_control can be used to run tests. The
master controls test mode and the slave is the device under test.
Each test is performed for multiple seconds. During a test, master
and slave usually hop over all channels defined in their Adaptive
Frequency Hopping (AFH) configuration. In conjunction with LMP_
set_AFH, AFH can be disabled on the attacked device; thus, causing
it to jam a selected frequency, which could be pilots of aWi-Fi signal
the attackerwants to block. To enable jamming of a single frequency,
the LMP_set_AFH payload must contain a valid Bluetooth clock,
which requires writing an assembly patch. A sequence of frames
successfully turning a Nexus 5 and Xperia Z3 into a remote jammer
is given in Listing 3. Note that LMP_set_AFH is not under perfect
control of the attacker without passing a proper Bluetooth clock.
AFH is not stopped on the attacking device but the device under
attack nevertheless temporarily accepts the AFH configuration.
With the presented payloads, the device under attack keeps hopping
on all Bluetooth channels most of the time as shown in Figure 9.
5.3 MAC Address Filter
As a basic defense against devices injecting malicious frames, a
MAC address filter can be used. Typically, users only use a few de-
vices they trust such as a headset. We implement a whitelist inside
LMP_dispatcher. Untrusted devices are rejected within LMP—an
attacker not imitating a valid MAC address cannot establish con-
nections and not even tamper with any of the LMP handlers or
protocols above. To successfully imitate a MAC address, attackers
need to analyze traffic with a Software-Defined Radio (SDR) for
a while to calculate the target address from demodulated signal
chunks [31]. In contrast to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth chunks do not con-
tain full MAC addresses, therefore guessing these is harder than in
Wi-Fi.
Currently, the MAC address filter is implemented as a simple
Python proof of concept executed at runtime by using InternalBlue
as a library. It can be integrated into more user friendly solutions,
such as an Android app that automatically generates a permanent
HCD file allowing only connections from devices that were suc-
cessfully paired at the time of its generation.
A MAC address filter is not required to defend against CVE-
2018-19860 by now, as most vendors rolled out patches. Broadcom
did not include us in the feedback loop after informing vendors in
December 2018, but we tested previously affected devices and can
confirm that our vulnerability was fixed in iOS 12.1.3. The macOS
update fixing the vulnerability increases the LMP subversion by
one.
6 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, InternalBlue is the only framework
that allows Bluetooth lower layer functionality to be patched on
off-the-shelf devices. InternalBluewas inspired byNexmon, a similar
project from our group, which realizes modifications on the Wi-Fi
part of BCM4339 [33]. Despite residing in the same chip, Wi-Fi
patching is realized very differently.
External tools for Bluetooth analysis always use an MITM setup.
No changes are required on the devices to be sniffed. However,
f
MHz
t
2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439
Starting test...
AFH disabled
Figure 9: Device Under Test Mode Exploit.
the MITM must successfully follow frequency hopping and over-
hear initial pairing to break encryption. Older variants of classic
Bluetooth and BLE have a weak encryption and passive MITM
is sufficient. If appropriate encryption is used, the MITM must ac-
tively inject traffic during key exchange. Depending on the physical
setup and tool implementation, breaking pairing might take multi-
ple tries—in either case the setup is rather artificial and users will
be most likely aware of sniffing. InternalBlue does not have any of
these issues in a sniffing setup and supports classic Bluetooth as
well as BLE, since it is part of the communication, but due to serv-
ing a similar purpose we briefly introduce other Bluetooth sniffing
tools in the following.
The most popular open-source solution Ubertooth [30] is an
SDR extended with Bluetooth capabilities, therefore providing PHY
access if frequency hopping succeeds. BLE sniffing support is quite
good as its PHY is rather simple, but classic Bluetooth sniffing is
very limited and not even attacks on bad encryption techniques are
implemented [35]. At a cost of 120$ it is comparably cheap [10]. It
might be possible that InternalBlue can also modify PHY behavior.
The Nexmon project altered the Wi-Fi part of BCM4339 and actually
found a re-programmable real-time D11 core [33].
Due to the simplicity of BLE, there exist a lot of low-price sniffers,
such as the BLE 4.0 Bluefruit LE Sniffer for $25 [6].
The BLE 4.2 CY5677 platform [22], which was used to implement
the ECDH device pairing attack [13], only costs $20 and comes with
CySmart to re-program the USB dongle’s behavior [23]. For lower
layers, it only allows to set some variables, which includes scan,
connection, and security parameters. Advanced protocol support
is only provided for layers above HCI, such as Generic Attribute
Profile (GATT) and Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol
(L2CAP).
Ellisys offers the best available Bluetooth tools in their Tracker,
Explorer and Vanguard series [27], but at the highest price (around
$10k-$20k). According to the Vanguard documentation, live views
and logs of all layers are displayed, and injections on HCI layer
are possible. Though, there is no interface to implement custom
lower-layer functions.
7 DISCUSSION
After describing the implementation InternalBlue and demonstrat-
ing that it is possible to develop capable tools with the framework,
we discuss its strengths, limitations, and impact.
Portability to Other Platforms. An ongoing task is porting Inter-
nalBlue to other members of the Broadcom and Cypress Bluetooth-
Wi-Fi chip series. We already ported some of the features to the
BCM4358 chip, which is part of theNexus 6P, Samsung Galaxy S6 and
Samsung Galaxy S6 edge. We verified that reading and writing RAM
works on very old chips, such as the BCM2070 with a firmware from
2008. Moreover, instead of requiring a rooted Android device with
a recompiled kernel module, we developed more a user-friendly
solution based on BlueZ sockets on Linux to support the cheaper
Raspberry Pi 3/3+ (BCM4343/BCM4345). Another work in progress is
firmware analysis of the Bluetooth 5.0 [18] compatible chips such as
CYW20735, which still provide Broadcom commands for firmware
modification. Since newer Bluetooth standards are backward com-
patible, recent Broadcom firmware still contains many functions
from older versions. Nevertheless, changes in the underlying oper-
ating system and data structures exist; hence, porting still requires
reverse engineering efforts.
To port InternalBlue to non-Broadcom platforms, their firmware
update mechanisms have to be reverse engineered. Significant func-
tions and data structures have to be located similar to our descrip-
tion in Section 2. Doing so is very time consuming and Broadcom
Bluetooth chips have a market share in the range of 20%–30%. Thus,
we did not make any efforts to support other vendors so far.
Early Bluetooth 5.1 Adaptation. InternalBlue can also help to
implement features from the new standard before they are available
on the market. The newest Bluetooth 5.1 [20] was just released and
as of now no hardware is available. Bluetooth 5.1 adds Angle of
Arrival (AoA) and Angle of Departure (AoD) localization. As these
require PHY adjustments, successful reverse engineering down
to a level where Broadcom chips can be used as SDR is required.
However, Bluetooth 5.1 also introduces new advertisement and
power saving mechanisms for the link layer, which are probably
easy to implement as binary patches.
Stability. When experimenting with Ubertooth, getting a setup
that actually sniffs a complete connection is challenging. This prob-
lem class does not apply to InternalBlue—one of the bigger advan-
tages of being able to modify a stable and well-maintained firmware
while it is part of a fully functional Android Bluetooth stack. Yet,
any crash due to firmware modifications will cause the Android
system to reset the chip; therefore it is recommended to carefully
test all InternalBlue patches to keep the same level of stability as
in the original firmware. Stability depends on finding a memory
region that is not used by other threads, which is very challenging
on the Nexus 5 but easy on the Bluetooth 5.0 evaluation kit. We are
currently improving stability by reverse engineering how memory
management and message queues work.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Coexistence. Most Broadcom chips support
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. They run on different ARM cores but share
some components such as the 2.4 GHz antenna. We found that
Broadcom supports interesting features such as a Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) sweep over all Bluetooth channels on
the local interface to figure out how they interfere with Wi-Fi and
select channels properly. Artifacts in the evaluation kit firmware
even indicate that LTE coexistence management exists. How well-
separated Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and LTE components are in terms of
performance and security remains an open research topic.
Wireless Firmware Security. Patching the vulnerable LMP handler
requires only 14 Bytes of machine code on Nexus 5. This appears
to be a simple fix, but installing it to all vulnerable devices is not.
Smartphones in a non-rooted standard configuration cannot use
InternalBlue and need to be provided with operating system updates
that include new HCD files. Older vulnerable devices might not be
updated—Broadcom confirmed us in December 2018 that they will
provide patches, but they did not mention which devices will be
fixed specifically.
Publishing patches as HCD files is generally risky, as they are
neither encrypted nor signed by Broadcom. Therefore, patches are
easy to reverse engineer and releasing a patch will disclose the vul-
nerability. Moreover, information leaks such as a full list of function
and object names in patch.elf ofWICED Studio are dangerous for
Broadcom’s security by obscurity approach.
After first reverse engineering results of Broadcom Wi-Fi chips
were published [34] it did not take long until security researchers
found severe security bugs in its implementation [12]. They further
analyzed these bugs to ultimately obtain privilege escalation in the
operating system with the Bluetooth driver’s superuser rights on
Apple devices. Even proprietary protocol extensions such as Apple
Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) based on Wi-Fi and Bluetooth had
major security issues in the past [36]. Reverse engineering shows
that security in today’s wireless chips depends a lot on obscurity,
which is not a sufficient measure.
In general, security-concerned users should turn off their de-
vice’s Wi-Fi and Bluetooth whenever they are not needed. Modern
smartphones sometimes require to disable Wi-Fi and Bluetooth in
the system settings to not just have them in a standby mode. On the
one hand, this also increases battery lifetime and avoids tracking of
users. On the other hand, a modern smartphone without wireless
services is severely impaired in its abilities.
Bluetooth Security Evaluation Toolkit. InternalBlue and its ap-
plications are filling the gap in the inventory of security-related
Bluetooth tools. Not only important and novel features such as
LMP monitoring and injection are added, but also the ECDH device
pairing vulnerability scan demonstrates its usage as testing toolkit
for advanced attacks. InternalBlue is limited to run on Broadcom
and Cypress chips due to its code modification mechanisms, but
devices under test can be of any kind.
Indeed, InternalBlue is powerful for LMP analysis. By leveraging
LMP injection capabilities it is possible to audit other Bluetooth de-
vices by enumerating proposed pairing and encryption capabilities.
Analyzing the extracted firmware enables emulation for fuzzing
as well as static code analysis. This paper only analyzed LMP but
there are more Bluetooth subprotocols that can contain bugs or are
of interest for developing and testing optimizations.
8 CONCLUSION
In the motivation we pointed out the shortage of openly available
research tools that allow for efficient experimenting on Bluetooth
protocol layers beneath the HCI. This work documents the devel-
opment of InternalBlue, a novel analysis and research platform for
lower Bluetooth protocol layers. The framework is based on multi-
ple Broadcom Bluetooth chipsets, whose firmware has been reverse
engineered and documented in the process. Undocumented patch-
ing mechanisms to even change ROM contents could be dissected
from the firmware update procedure and therefore InternalBlue
benefits from the ability to reuse and modify the existing Bluetooth
stack implemented in the controller. These patching mechanisms
exist at least throughout firmware versions from 2008 to 2018. We
found that newly released off-the-shelf devices typically are shipped
with two year old wireless chips, so even if Broadcom decided to
secure their patching mechanisms today, InternalBlue will continue
to work on hardware released over the next few years.
Eventually, the framework has proven itself as a powerful tool
for LMP monitoring and injection, as well as a security testing
toolkit. With this paper, we lay the groundwork for the community
to further contribute to advanced Bluetooth research. Even though
InternalBlue is based on Broadcom chips, it can be used to probe
other, non-Broadcom Bluetooth devices.
Overall, the addition of a new tool to the inventory of researchers
advances the state of Bluetooth security and facilitates integration
of new protocol features. Furthermore, reverse engineering the
firmware of a commercial Bluetooth controller paves the way for
open reviews by the security community and may reveal vulnera-
bilities that have been hidden up to this point.
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